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			Intellectual Property Tactics Implemented in China by Transnational ompany and Its Regulation  
                    Abstracts: The intellectual  property tactics adopted by the transnational companies include: first, to establish  R&D institute in China; second, to rush to apply for registration of patents,  trademarks and designs in China; third, to impose pressure on the government to  protect intellectual property by federating and allying, or making full use of local  remedy. These tactics possibly produced two negative effects: monopoly and abuse  of monopoly power based on technological predominance; and limiting local companies’  competitiveness through claims for protecting intellectual property. This essay  emphasize the necessity to restrict and eliminate the negative effects of such tactics  through antimonopoly and intellectual property law. What China need do now is to carry such restrictions  through its legislation, implementation and judgment.  
              Key words:  transnational company, intellectual property, abuse,  regulate  
              Background for China’s Legislation   
                China has  experienced dramatic development in the growth of a rule-based approach to its market  and the operation of economic law. These law reform efforts have sought to keep  pace with the speed at which the market economy has grown in China over this  time. However the development of a sophisticated system of competition law has tended  to lag well behind rapid market developments that have been occurring.  
              The Chinese legal system has changed considerably  over the past tow decades, but particularly since 1992. Increased interaction with  the world economy and the dynamic of globalization and has brought a range of powerful  foreign influences to bear. However, the record of Chinese legal reform in the areas  of economy reveals a relatively consistent pattern by which foreign legal norms  and institutional arrangements are adjusted to meet local political and ideological  imperatives.  
              China’s accession  to the GATT and WTO imposes further impetus on this process. The GATT/WTO disciplines  of non-discrimination, transparency and non-trade-distorted will require wideranging  changes in the areas of legal system. There is every indications that China’s policymakers see China’s WTO accession  agreement as a means to fulfilling broader goals. One broader strategic goal is  to faci-litate the peaceful emergence of China as a great trading nation—and  to avoid the trade tensions associated with the emergence of major new traders in  the past. Another goalis to accelerate the process of domestic reform.  
              The legal reforms undertaken by the Chinese  government since 1978 reflect the interplay of foreign legal norms with a local  context. At the very outset of the legal reform process, legal reformers were admonished  to learn from China’s  past and from the experience of foreign countries. As the economic reforms accelerated,  China’s legal specialists looked  increasingly to Europe and North America for inspiration.   The process of borrowing form abroad accelerated  during the second decade of legal reform as a wider array of legal scholars and  officials recognized that China’s economic reforms required the Chinese legal system  to conform more fully with the international system.  
              In most western countries, different views have  been expressed about the regulation of competition ranging from the almost complete  abandonment of the government’s intervention in this area at one extreme to those  advocating stronger government intervention at the other extreme. But in China, the focus  of legislative debate is on how and whether to take back the authorisation of monopoly  in some industries, especially to the state-owned enterprises. On the other hand,  some multinational companies who have obtained the dominate status in China’s market also  object to the competition legislation.  
              While the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, Price  Law, Foreign Trade Law, and many other Chinese laws and regulations touch on some  of these issues, existing measures are not enforced as a coherent competition policy.  Proposals for a comprehensive Antimonopoly Law surfaced in 1987, and drafters from  various agencies and academic institutions began drafting in 1994. The resulting  draft reflects divergent, often inconsistent goals. Until now, the decade-long drafting  of China’s  Antimonopoly still cannot see the exact ending time.   
              China’s vast  domestic market is becoming larger and deeper by the day. This makes enforcement  of its competition law ever more important. When China enacts its Antimonopoly Law, that  legislation will be applicable to the largest population as well as the fastest  growing economy in the world.   
              China Competition  Legislation   
                Up to now, China has only one effective competition  law, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of PRC, which was promulgated on September  2, 1993.  Article 1under Chapter 1 of the  Anti-Unfair Competition Law provides that the objective of the law is to safeguard  wholesome development of socialist market economy, to encourage and to protect fair  competition, to curb unfair competition, and to protect rights and interests of  business and consumers.  
              China has  been a transitional economy for some time, which means, in the legal context, it  often has many simplified codes that are temporary or experimental. The Anti-Unfair  Competition Law is one example. It prohibits a wide range of  “unfair competition practices” like: counterfeiting,  bribery, false advertising, misappropriation of trade secrets, trade libel, improper  sales schemes using prizes, adminis trative monopolies, lockouts from local market,  predatory pricing, abuse of dominate market position by public utilities, and bid  rigging.   
              The Anti-Unfair Competition Law includes some  contents of modern competition law, but actually it is still a little like trade-constraint  law in the common law countries. Likewise, rules governing the abuse of dominant  market position, and the related rules governing predatory pricing and discrimination,  could allow the competition law authorities to determine what is the right-or, fair-price  to charge. But the principles and methodology of the western competition law are  still not introduced into the legislation and enforcement.  
              The anticipated enactment of the PRC Antimonopoly  Law will be a major milestone in China's legal development. The endgame  to the decadelong drafting of China's  Antimonopoly Law may finally be at hand. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) submitted  a final draft to the State Council earlier 2005, and the State Council is reportedly  vetting the law for adoption by the National People's Congress (NPC). Chinese observers  now predict the law's enactment in the near future, possibly in 2007.  
              The draft Antimonopoly Law is clearly patterned  after the German/EU competition law model, and somewhat affected by the American  antitrust law and the other Asian competition legislation enacted earlier. We could  find in the draft the prescriptions of horizontal restrictive practices, cartel,  predatory pricing and discrimination, abuse of dominant market status and so on.    
              The most controversial provision in the draft  Antimonopoly Law will be rules against administrative monopolies. Likewise, European  law prohibits state aid measures preventing the formation of a single market. In  the Untied States, the famous “state action doctrine” dels with the same issues,   albeit on a much smaller scale because there  is much less government involvement in the American economy. The contradiction on  this issue is severe in China.  The competition law authorities in China will have to tackle government  monopolies or government instrumentalities operating in the marketplace.  
              Clearly, China has an industrial policy through  which it wishes to create national champions that would be globally competitive.  China believes strongly in this  policy and thinks it is only fair for China to catch up with the world in  this way. Pending enactment of the draft Antimonopoly Law including its merger control  rules, China  has already implemented rules governing acquisitions by foreign companies. Foreign  firms are justifiably concerned, as a government competition report criticized Microsoft,  Kodak, Tetra Pak and others as monopolies.  
              PRC competition policy may yet emerge as a scalpel  for removing truly anticompetitive practices, a cudgel for threatening competitors  of favored firms, a gaping sieve that fails to catch anticompetitive conduct, or  all three. It is too soon to tell. At this stage, foreign firms active in China should begin  assessing their own business practices (and those of their competitors) in anticipation  of the Antimonopoly Law's enactment. Conduct barred by foreign competition rules  may eventually be actionable under the Antimonopoly Law. Enforcement may depend  more on the context—the industry, locale, the affected parties, and their political  sponsors—than on the literal antitrust rules. Capricious enforcement and unclear  rules will chill competition, undermining its benefits to China's consumers.  In the end, the credibility and effect of Chinese antitrust law will depend on the  choices made by China's  fledgling antitrust authorities.  
              M&A Practices in China   
                A fascinating phenomenon of mergers, acquisitions,  consolidations and restructuring is taking place in China. Thousands of rapidly growing  businesses, riding on the wave of China’s unprecedented economic expansion,  represent the latent potential for acquisition and restructuring of existing investments.  
              China is in the midst of transitioning its planned  economy, which has traditionally been dominated by mammoth stateowned enterprises  (“SOEs”), to a market economy (albeit one with “Chinese characteristics,” as famously  stated by Deng Xiaoping during the launc of China's marketopening efforts in the  late 1970s) that includes private enterprises (increasingly, “privatized” SOEs)  and foreign invested enterprises. Bolstering this transition has been the gradual  emergence of a body of commercial laws and regulations that today includes, among  others, a Company Law, Contract Law, Consumer Rights Law, Product Quality Law, Anti-Unfair  Competition Law, and Pricing Law. For example, the March 2003 M&A Regulation expressly requires government  review for certain M&A activities where certain “market share” hurdles are met.  
              Gone are the days when foreign companies wishing  to invest in China were limited  to greenfield investments.  They may now purchase operating Chinese businesses and may restructure their existing  investments in China  through mergers, spin-offs, and holding companies that were impossible only a few  years ago. These developments are not confined to foreign investors. Domestic Chinese  companies are also merging and acquiring one another, and the more successful among  them have begun to buy out foreign investors. The result of all of these developments  is a rapidly expanding mergers-and-acquisitions (M&A) market in China.  
              For M&A transactions, the most significant  impact of China’s  WTO entry may be the country’s implementation of its commitments to open, or raise  the limits on the maximum foreign investment permitted in, several important service  sectors, notably telecommunications, insurance, and banking. China has also agreed to eliminate prohibitions on  foreign distribution activities in China, which will effectively broaden  the authorized business scopes of many existing foreign invested enterprises and  permit investment in a much wider range of distribution and retail activities. The  result will be an M&A market that is larger and increasingly relevant to both  foreign and domestic companies in China.  
              However, as discussed earlier, acquisition of  Chinese companies and assets is a relatively recent development, and related rules  and implementation regulations are in the process of development or subject to further  clarification.  In addition, the increasing  political pressure in China  to review sizable acquisitions of Chinese companies by foreign investors invokes  caution and may add additional difficulties to the already complicated acquisition  process.  However, the opening of the M&A  floodgate in China  is irrevocable, and new ground will continue to be broken as multinationals continue  to adapt to the local M&A market.  
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